Technique.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may physically introduce computer accessories, networking hardware, or other computing devices into a system or network that can be used as a vector to gain access. Rather than just connecting and distributing payloads via removable storage (i.e. Replication Through Removable Media), more robust hardware additions can be used to introduce new functionalities and/or features into a system that can then be abused.
While public references of usage by threat actors are scarce, many red teams/penetration testers leverage hardware additions for initial access. Commercial and open source products can be leveraged with capabilities such as passive network tapping, network traffic modification (i.e. Adversary-in-the-Middle), keystroke injection, kernel memory reading via DMA, addition of new wireless access points to an existing network, and others.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1200.
| Rule | Level | Log source |
|---|---|---|
| Device Installation Blocked | medium | windows / NULL |
| External Disk Drive Or USB Storage Device Was Recognized By The System | low | windows / NULL |
| USB Device Plugged | low | windows / NULL |
| Rule | Type | Risk | Data source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Detect ARP Poisoning | TTP | NULL | Cisco IOS Logs |
| Detect IPv6 Network Infrastructure Threats | TTP | NULL | Cisco IOS Logs |
| Detect Port Security Violation | TTP | NULL | Cisco IOS Logs |
| Detect Rogue DHCP Server | TTP | NULL | Cisco IOS Logs |
| Detect Traffic Mirroring | TTP | NULL | Cisco IOS Logs |
| Linux Auditd Hardware Addition Swapoff | Anomaly | NULL | Linux Auditd Execve |
| Linux Hardware Addition SwapOff | Anomaly | NULL | Sysmon for Linux EventID 1 |
| Windows Process Executed From Removable Media | Anomaly | NULL | Sysmon EventID 1 AND Sysmon EventID 13 |
| Windows USBSTOR Registry Key Modification | Anomaly | NULL | Sysmon EventID 12, Sysmon EventID 13 |
| Windows WPDBusEnum Registry Key Modification | Anomaly | NULL | Sysmon EventID 12, Sysmon EventID 13 |
None recorded.
None recorded.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupDarkVishnya | DarkVishnya physically connected Bash Bunny, Raspberry Pi, netbooks, and inexpensive laptops to the target organization's environment to access the company’s local network. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.