Trust Modification

T1484.002

Sub-technique of T1484 Domain or Tenant Policy Modification.View on attack.mitre.org

About this technique

Adversaries may add new domain trusts, modify the properties of existing domain trusts, or otherwise change the configuration of trust relationships between domains and tenants to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges.Trust details, such as whether or not user identities are federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains or tenants for the purpose of accessing shared resources. These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains.

Manipulating these trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, in Microsoft Active Directory (AD) environments, this may be used to forge SAML Tokens without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert an AD domain to a federated domain using Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.

An adversary may also add a new federated identity provider to an identity tenant such as Okta or AWS IAM Identity Center, which may enable the adversary to authenticate as any user of the tenant. This may enable the threat actor to gain broad access into a variety of cloud-based services that leverage the identity tenant. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary that creates a new identity provider for an AWS Organization will be able to federate into all of the AWS Organization member accounts without creating identities for each of the member accounts.

Detection rules4

Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1484.002.

Sigma1

RuleLevelLog source
New Federated Domain Addedmediumm365 / NULL

Splunk3

RuleTypeRiskData source
Azure AD New Custom Domain AddedTTPNULLAzure Active Directory Add unverified domain
Azure AD New Federated Domain AddedTTPNULLAzure Active Directory Set domain authentication
O365 Cross-Tenant Access ChangeTTPNULLOffice 365 Universal Audit Log

Groups2

Software1

Campaigns1

Procedure examples4

Groups2

Used byProcedure example
GroupScattered Spider

Scattered Spider adds a federated identity provider to the victim’s SSO tenant and activates automatic account linking.

GroupStorm-0501

Storm-0501 created a new federated domain within the victim Microsoft Entra tenant using Global Administrator level access to establish a persistent backdoor for later use.

Software1

Used byProcedure example
ToolAADInternals

AADInternals can create a backdoor by converting a domain to a federated domain which will be able to authenticate any user across the tenant. AADInternals can also modify DesktopSSO information.

Campaigns1

Used byProcedure example
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 changed domain federation trust settings using Azure AD administrative permissions to configure the domain to accept authorization tokens signed by their own SAML signing certificate.

References4

  1. AADInternals zure AD Federated Domain Open source
    Dr. Nestori Syynimaa. (2017, November 16). Security vulnerability in Azure AD & Office 365 identity federation. Retrieved September 28, 2022.
  2. AWS re Inforce Trust Mod Open source
    AWS re Inforce. (2024, June). Retrieved April 15, 2026.
  3. Microsoft - Azure AD Federation Open source
    Microsoft. (2018, November 28). What is federation with Azure AD?. Retrieved December 30, 2020.
  4. Okta Cross-Tenant Impersonation 2023 Open source
    Okta Defensive Cyber Operations. (2023, August 31). Cross-Tenant Impersonation: Prevention and Detection. Retrieved February 15, 2024.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.