Sub-technique of T1546 Event Triggered Execution.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. References to various COM objects are stored in the Registry.
Adversaries may use the COM system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.
One variation of COM hijacking involves abusing Type Libraries (TypeLibs), which provide metadata about COM objects, such as their interfaces and methods. Adversaries may modify Registry keys associated with TypeLibs to redirect legitimate COM object functionality to malicious scripts or payloads. Unlike traditional COM hijacking, which commonly uses local DLLs, this variation may leverage the "script:" moniker to execute remote scripts hosted on external servers. This approach enables stealthy execution of code while maintaining persistence, as the remote payload would be automatically downloaded whenever the hijacked COM object is accessed.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1546.015.
| Rule | Level | Log source |
|---|---|---|
| COM Object Hijacking Via Modification Of Default System CLSID Default Value | high | windows / registry_set |
| Potential PSFactoryBuffer COM Hijacking | high | windows / registry_set |
| Rundll32 Registered COM Objects | high | windows / process_creation |
| COM Hijacking via TreatAs | medium | windows / registry_set |
| Potential COM Object Hijacking Via TreatAs Subkey - Registry | medium | windows / registry_set |
| Potential Persistence Using DebugPath | medium | windows / registry_set |
| Potential Persistence Via Scrobj.dll COM Hijacking | medium | windows / registry_set |
| Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID ShellExecute | medium | windows / ps_script |
| Rule | Type | Risk | Data source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Powershell COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification | TTP | NULL | Powershell Script Block Logging 4104 |
| Powershell Execute COM Object | TTP | NULL | Powershell Script Block Logging 4104 |
| Windows COM Hijacking InprocServer32 Modification | TTP | NULL | Sysmon EventID 1, Windows Event Log Security 4688, CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 |
None recorded.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupAPT28 | APT28 has used COM hijacking for persistence by replacing the legitimate |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| MalwareADVSTORESHELL | Some variants of ADVSTORESHELL achieve persistence by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object. |
| MalwareBBSRAT | BBSRAT has been seen persisting via COM hijacking through replacement of the COM object for MruPidlList |
| MalwareComRAT | ComRAT samples have been seen which hijack COM objects for persistence by replacing the path to shell32.dll in registry location |
| MalwareFerocious | Ferocious can use COM hijacking to establish persistence. |
| MalwareJHUHUGIT | JHUHUGIT has used COM hijacking to establish persistence by hijacking a class named MMDeviceEnumerator and also by registering the payload as a Shell Icon Overlay handler COM object ({3543619C-D563-43f7-95EA-4DA7E1CC396A}). |
| MalwareKONNI | KONNI has modified ComSysApp service to load the malicious DLL payload. |
| MalwareMosquito | Mosquito uses COM hijacking as a method of persistence. |
| ToolPcShare | PcShare has created the `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\\InprocServer32` Registry key for persistence. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.