Technique.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads.
Debugger evasion may include changing behaviors based on the results of the checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a debugged environment. Similar to Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, if the adversary detects a debugger, they may alter their malware to disengage from the victim or conceal the core functions of the implant. They may also search for debugger artifacts before dropping secondary or additional payloads.
Specific checks will vary based on the target and/or adversary. On Windows, this may involve Native API function calls such as IsDebuggerPresent() and NtQueryInformationProcess(), or manually checking the BeingDebugged flag of the Process Environment Block (PEB). On Linux, this may involve querying `/proc/self/status` for the `TracerPID` field, which indicates whether or not the process is being traced by dynamic analysis tools. Other checks for debugging artifacts may also seek to enumerate hardware breakpoints, interrupt assembly opcodes, time checks, or measurements if exceptions are raised in the current process (assuming a present debugger would “swallow” or handle the potential error).
Malware may also leverage Structured Exception Handling (SEH) to detect debuggers by throwing an exception and detecting whether the process is suspended. SEH handles both hardware and software expectations, providing control over the exceptions including support for debugging. If a debugger is present, the program’s control will be transferred to the debugger, and the execution of the code will be suspended. If the debugger is not present, control will be transferred to the SEH handler, which will automatically handle the exception and allow the program’s execution to continue.
Adversaries may use the information learned from these debugger checks during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors. Debuggers can also be evaded by detaching the process or flooding debug logs with meaningless data via messages produced by looping Native API function calls such as OutputDebugStringW().
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1622.
| Rule | Level | Log source |
|---|---|---|
| PUA - Process Hacker Execution | medium | windows / process_creation |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has embedded debug strings with messages to distract analysts. Mustang Panda has also made calls to Windows API `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` and exits if it detects a debugger. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| MalwareANELLDR | ANELLDR can call `ZwSetInformationThread` with the second argument set to `ThreadHideFromDebugger (0x11)` to evade being debugged. |
| ToolAsyncRAT | AsyncRAT can use the `CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent` function to detect the presence of a debugger. |
| MalwareBlack Basta | The Black Basta dropper can check system flags, CPU registers, CPU instructions, process timing, system libraries, and APIs to determine if a debugger is present. |
| MalwareBumblebee | Bumblebee can search for tools used in static analysis. |
| MalwareDarkGate | DarkGate checks the |
| MalwareDarkTortilla | DarkTortilla can detect debuggers by using functions such as `DebuggerIsAttached` and `DebuggerIsLogging`. DarkTortilla can also detect profilers by verifying the `COR_ENABLE_PROFILING` environment variable is present and active. |
| MalwareDRATzarus | DRATzarus can use `IsDebuggerPresent` to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim. |
| MalwareLatrodectus | Latrodectus has the ability to check for the presence of debuggers. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| CampaignOperation Dream Job | During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that used the `IsDebuggerPresent` call to detect debuggers. |
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