Windows File and Directory Permissions Enable Inheritance: endpointEndpointNoneversion:7
The following analytic detects the enabling of permission inheritance using ICACLS. This analytic identifies instances where ICACLS commands are used to enable permission inheritance on files or directories. The /inheritance:e flag, which restores inherited permissions from a parent directory, is monitored to detect changes that might reapply broader access control settings. Enabling inheritance can indicate legitimate administrative actions but may also signal attempts to override restrictive custom permissions, potentially exposing sensitive files to unauthorized access.
Windows Executable Masquerading as Benign File Types: endpointEndpointNoneversion:5
The following analytic detects the presence of executable files masquerading as benign file types on Windows systems. Adversaries employ this technique to evade defenses and trick users into executing malicious code by renaming executables with extensions commonly associated with documents, images, or other non-executable formats (e.g., .pdf, .jpg, .doc, .png).
Windows NetSupport RMM DLL Loaded By Uncommon Process: endpointEndpointNoneversion:4
The following analytic detects the loading of specific dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) associated with the NetSupport Remote Manager (RMM) tool by any process on a Windows system.
Modules such as CryptPak.dll, HTCTL32.DLL, IPCTL32.DLL, keyshowhook.dll, pcicapi.DLL, PCICL32.DLL, and TCCTL32.DLL, are integral to NetSupport's functionality.
This detection is particularly valuable when these modules are loaded by processes running from unusual directories (e.g., Downloads, ProgramData, or user-specific folders) rather than the legitimate Program Files installation path, or by executables that have been renamed but retain the internal "client32" identifier.
This helps to identify instances where the legitimate NetSupport tool is being misused by adversaries as a Remote Access Trojan (RAT).
Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Entry: endpointEndpointNoneversion:18
The following analytic detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion registry entries. It leverages endpoint registry data to identify changes in the registry path "*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows Defender\\Exclusions\\*". This activity is significant because adversaries often modify these entries to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute without detection. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus defenses, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities undetected.
Windows File and Directory Enable ReadOnly Permissions: endpointEndpointNoneversion:7
The following analytic detects instances where file or folder permissions are modified to grant read-only access. Such changes are characterized by the presence of read-related permissions (e.g., R, REA, RA, RD) and the absence of write (W) or execute (E) permissions. Monitoring these events is crucial for tracking access control changes that could be intentional for restricting access or indicative of malicious behavior. Alerts generated by this detection help ensure that legitimate security measures are enforced while unauthorized changes are promptly investigated.
LOLBAS With Network Traffic: networkEndpoint2026-04-15version:17
The following analytic identifies the use of Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) with network traffic. It leverages data from the Network Traffic data model to detect when native Windows binaries, often abused by adversaries, initiate network connections. This activity is significant as LOLBAS are frequently used to download malicious payloads, enabling lateral movement, command-and-control, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.
Windows Scheduled Task with Highest Privileges: endpointEndpointNoneversion:16
The following analytic detects the creation of a new scheduled task with the highest execution privileges via Schtasks.exe. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) logs to monitor for specific command-line parameters ('/rl' and 'highest') in schtasks.exe executions. This activity is significant as it is commonly used in AsyncRAT attacks for persistence and privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistent access and execute tasks with elevated privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized system access and data breaches.
Domain Controller Discovery with Nltest: endpointEndpointNoneversion:14
The following analytic detects the execution of `nltest.exe` with command-line arguments `/dclist:` or `/dsgetdc:` to discover domain controllers. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `nltest.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out domain controllers, facilitating further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
Windows Modify Registry Delete Firewall Rules: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic detects a potential deletion of firewall rules, indicating a possible security breach or unauthorized access attempt. It identifies actions where firewall rules are removed using commands like netsh advfirewall firewall delete rule, which can expose the network to external threats by disabling critical security measures. Monitoring these activities helps maintain network integrity and prevent malicious attacks.
Windows Modify Registry to Add or Modify Firewall Rule: endpointEndpointNoneversion:12
The following analytic detects a potential addition or modification of firewall rules, signaling possible configuration changes or security policy adjustments. It tracks commands such as netsh advfirewall firewall add rule and netsh advfirewall firewall set rule, which may indicate attempts to alter network access controls. Monitoring these actions ensures the integrity of firewall settings and helps prevent unauthorized network access.
Windows Credentials from Password Stores Deletion: endpointEndpointNoneversion:13
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool cmdkey.exe with the /delete parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. The activity is significant because cmdkey.exe can be used by attackers to delete stored credentials, potentially leading to privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to remove stored user credentials, hindering incident response efforts and enabling further unauthorized access to the compromised system.
Windows RMM Tool Execution: endpointEndpointNoneversion:2
Detects process creation events of various remote access tools.
Remote management tools, when used for legitimate purposes, can help IT professionals and system administrators remotely access and manage computer systems.
However, threat actors may exploit these tools for malicious purposes.
Windows Cabinet File Extraction Via Expand: endpointEndpointNoneversion:5
Detects usage of expand.exe to extract Microsoft Cabinet (CAB) archives, with
emphasis on extractions into `C:\\ProgramData` or similar staging locations. In
recent APT37 activity, a CAB payload (e.g., wonder.cab) was expanded into
ProgramData prior to persistence and execution. This behavior is a strong signal
for ingress tool transfer and staging of payloads.
Windows File Download Via PowerShell: endpointEndpointNoneversion:10
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell's download methods such as
"DownloadString" and "DownloadData" from the WebClient class or Invoke-WebRequest
and it's aliases "IWR" or "Curl".
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on
process execution logs that include command-line details.
This activity can be significant such methods and functions are commonly used in malicious
PowerShell scripts to fetch and execute remote code.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to download and run
arbitrary code, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data exfiltration,
or further compromise of the affected system.
Add or Set Windows Defender Exclusion: endpointEndpointNoneversion:18
The following analytic detects the use of commands to add or set exclusions
in Windows Defender. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)
agents, focusing on command-line executions involving "Add-MpPreference" or "Set-MpPreference"
with exclusion parameters. This activity is significant because adversaries often
use it to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute undetected.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus
detection, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities without
interference from Windows Defender.
Disable Windows Behavior Monitoring: endpointEndpointNoneversion:24
The following analytic identifies modifications in the registry to disable Windows Defender's real-time behavior monitoring. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with Windows Defender settings. This activity is significant because disabling real-time protection is a common tactic used by malware such as RATs, bots, or Trojans to evade detection. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or persist in the environment without being detected by antivirus software.
Suspicious Scheduled Task from Public Directory: endpointEndpointNoneversion:21
The following analytic identifies the creation of scheduled tasks that execute binaries or scripts from public directories, such as users\public, \programdata\, or \windows\temp, using schtasks.exe with the /create command. It leverages Sysmon Event ID 1 data to detect this behavior. This activity is significant because it often indicates an attempt to maintain persistence or execute malicious scripts, which are common tactics in malware deployment. If confirmed as malicious, this could lead to data compromise, unauthorized access, and potential lateral movement within the network.
Powershell Fileless Script Contains Base64 Encoded Content: endpointEndpointNoneversion:22
The following analytic detects the execution of PowerShell scripts containing Base64 encoded content, specifically identifying the use of `FromBase64String`. It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode=4104) to capture and analyze the full command sent to PowerShell. This activity is significant as Base64 encoding is often used by attackers to obfuscate malicious payloads, making it harder to detect. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to code execution, allowing attackers to run arbitrary commands and potentially compromise the system.
System Information Discovery Detection: endpointWindowsNoneversion:16
The following analytic identifies system information discovery techniques, such as the execution of commands like `wmic qfe`, `systeminfo`, and `hostname`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because attackers often use these commands to gather system configuration details, which can aid in further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to tailor their attacks based on the discovered system information, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or data exfiltration.
Powershell Windows Defender Exclusion Commands: endpointEndpointNoneversion:17
The following analytic detects the use of PowerShell commands to add or set Windows Defender exclusions.
It leverages EventCode 4104 to identify suspicious `Add-MpPreference` or `Set-MpPreference` commands with exclusion parameters.
This activity is significant because adversaries often use it to bypass Windows Defender, allowing malicious code to execute without detection.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to evade antivirus defenses, maintain persistence, and execute further malicious activities undetected.
Detect MSHTA Url in Command Line: endpointEndpointNoneversion:21
The following analytic detects the use of Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to make remote HTTP or HTTPS connections. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments containing URLs. This activity is significant because adversaries often use mshta.exe to download and execute remote .hta files, bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network infiltration.
Allow Inbound Traffic In Firewall Rule: endpointEndpointNoneversion:13
The following analytic detects a suspicious PowerShell command that allows inbound traffic to a specific local port within the public profile. It leverages PowerShell script block logging (EventCode 4104) to identify commands containing keywords like "firewall," "Inbound," "Allow," and "-LocalPort." This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to establish remote access by modifying firewall rules. If confirmed malicious, this could allow unauthorized access to the machine, potentially leading to further exploitation and data exfiltration.
LOLBAS Network Connection On Uncommon Port: networkEndpointNoneversion:1
The following analytic identifies Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) that can legitimately initiate public network connections but are communicating over uncommon destination ports.
It leverages the Network Traffic data model and applies per-binary common-port exclusions to reduce false positives while preserving suspicious non-standard communication.
This behavior may indicate payload download, command-and-control, proxy execution, or attempts to blend malicious traffic into trusted Windows binaries.
Join this detection with the Process Execution events to provide context and avoid false positives.
ICACLS Grant Command: endpointEndpointNoneversion:14
The following analytic detects the use of the ICACLS command to grant
additional access permissions to files or directories. It leverages data from Endpoint
Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process names and command-line
arguments. This activity is significant because it is commonly used by Advanced
Persistent Threats (APTs) and coinminer scripts to evade detection and maintain
control over compromised systems. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow
attackers to manipulate file permissions, potentially leading to unauthorized access,
data exfiltration, or further system compromise.
Windows Credentials from Password Stores Creation: endpointEndpointNoneversion:12
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool cmdkey.exe, which is used to create stored usernames, passwords, or credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because cmdkey.exe is often abused by post-exploitation tools and malware, such as Darkgate, to gain unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to escalate privileges and maintain persistence on the targeted host, facilitating further attacks and potential data breaches.
Windows Firewall Rule Deletion: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
This detection identifies instances where a Windows Firewall rule has been deleted, potentially exposing the system to security risks. Unauthorized removal of firewall rules can indicate an attacker attempting to bypass security controls or malware disabling protections for persistence and command-and-control communication. The event logs details such as the deleted rule name, protocol, port, and the user responsible for the action. Security teams should monitor for unexpected deletions, correlate with related events, and investigate anomalies to prevent unauthorized access and maintain network security posture.
Windows RDP Connection Successful: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic detects successful Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) connections by monitoring EventCode 1149 from the Windows TerminalServices RemoteConnectionManager Operational log. This detection is significant as successful RDP connections can indicate remote access to a system, which may be leveraged by attackers to control or exfiltrate data. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access, data theft, or further lateral movement within the network. Monitoring successful RDP connections is crucial for identifying potential security breaches and mitigating risks promptly.
LOLBAS Rare Network Connection: networkEndpointNoneversion:1
The following analytic identifies public network connections initiated by Living Off the Land Binaries and Scripts (LOLBAS) that rarely require direct outbound network access.
It leverages the Network Traffic data model and focuses on native Windows binaries where any public destination should be investigated and explicitly approved.
This activity may indicate proxy execution, process injection, payload download, command-and-control, or other abuse of trusted binaries to evade security controls.
Keep in mind that some of these binaries, such as Netsh.exe, Gpscript.exe, Wmic.exe, etc., will occasionally communicate with public network resources to perform their intended function.
Exclude said processes from the detection if they are too noisy for your environment.
Join this detection with the Process Execution events to provide context and avoid false positives.
Scheduled Task Deleted Or Created via CMD: endpointEndpointNoneversion:28
The following analytic detects the creation or deletion of scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe when invoked with create or delete flags, specifically focusing on those executions where the process includes additional parameters such as /tr, /sc, or /ru. The detection uses Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry mapped to the Endpoint data model, and filters out events originating from trusted system paths like C:\Windows\System32 or C:\Program Files. It further narrows results to cases where schtasks.exe is launched by potentially suspicious parent processes such as cmd.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe, and excludes service accounts. This behavior may indicate adversary efforts to gain persistence or evade detection by manipulating scheduled tasks using scripts or command shells. If confirmed malicious, such activity could lead to unauthorized code execution or the removal of monitoring mechanisms on endpoints.
Windows PowerShell FakeCAPTCHA Clipboard Execution: endpointEndpointNoneversion:9
This detection identifies potential FakeCAPTCHA/ClickFix clipboard hijacking campaigns by looking for PowerShell execution with hidden window parameters and distinctive strings related to fake CAPTCHA verification. These campaigns use social engineering to trick users into pasting malicious PowerShell commands from their clipboard, typically delivering information stealers or remote access trojans.
Ntdsutil Export NTDS: endpointEndpointNoneversion:12
The following analytic detects the use of Ntdsutil to export the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because exporting NTDS.dit can be a precursor to offline password cracking, posing a severe security risk. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain access to sensitive credentials, potentially leading to unauthorized access and privilege escalation within the network.
Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool cmdkey.exe, which is often abused by post-exploitation tools like winpeas, commonly used in ransomware attacks to list stored usernames, passwords, or credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as it indicates potential credential harvesting, which can lead to privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information and maintain control over compromised systems for further exploitation.
Windows RunMRU Registry Key or Value Deleted: endpointEndpointNoneversion:4
The following analytic detects the deletion or modification of Most Recently Used (MRU) command entries stored within the Windows Registry. Adversaries often clear these registry keys, such as HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU, to remove forensic evidence of commands executed via the Windows Run dialog or other system utilities. This activity aims to obscure their actions, hinder incident response efforts, and evade detection. Detection focuses on monitoring for changes (deletion of values or modification of the MRUList value) to these specific registry paths, particularly when performed by unusual processes or outside of typical user behavior. Anomalous deletion events can indicate an attempt at defense evasion or post-exploitation cleanup by a malicious actor.
Windows Firewall Rule Added: endpointEndpointNoneversion:9
This detection identifies instances where a Windows Firewall rule is added by monitoring Event ID 4946 in the Windows Security Event Log. Firewall rule modifications can indicate legitimate administrative actions, but they may also signal unauthorized changes, misconfigurations, or malicious activity such as attackers allowing traffic for backdoors or persistence mechanisms. By analyzing fields like RuleName, RuleId, Computer, and ProfileChanged, security teams can determine whether the change aligns with expected behavior. Correlating with user activity and process execution can help distinguish false positives from real threats, ensuring better visibility into potential security risks.
Registry Keys Used For Persistence: endpointEndpointNoneversion:35
The following analytic identifies modifications to registry keys commonly used for persistence mechanisms. It leverages data from endpoint detection sources like Sysmon or Carbon Black, focusing on specific registry paths known to initiate applications or services during system startup. This activity is significant as unauthorized changes to these keys can indicate attempts to maintain persistence or execute malicious actions upon system boot. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to achieve persistent access, execute arbitrary code, or maintain control over compromised systems, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.
Windows Firewall Rule Modification: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
This detection identifies instances where a Windows Firewall rule has been modified, which may indicate an attempt to alter security policies. Unauthorized modifications can weaken firewall protections, allowing malicious traffic or preventing legitimate communications. The event logs details such as the modified rule name, protocol, ports, application path, and the user responsible for the change. Security teams should monitor unexpected modifications, correlate them with related events, and investigate anomalies to prevent unauthorized access and maintain network security integrity.
