Windows Audit Policy Excluded Category via Auditpol: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/set" and "/exclude" command-line arguments which indicates that the user's per-user policy will cause audit to be suppressed regardless of the system audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to exclude specific users events from log data. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows Audit Policy Disabled via Auditpol: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/set" command-line argument in order to disable a specific category or sub-category from the audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows Important Audit Policy Disabled: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic detects the disabling of important audit policies. It leverages EventCode 4719 from Windows Security Event Logs to identify changes where success or failure auditing is removed. This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker may have gained access to the domain controller and is attempting to evade detection by tampering with audit policies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe consequences, including data theft, privilege escalation, and full network compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine the source and intent of the change.
Windows Audit Policy Auditing Option Modified - Registry: endpointEndpointNoneversion:7
The following analytic detects potentially suspicious modifications to the Audit Policy auditing options registry values. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, focusing on changes to one of the following auditing option values "CrashOnAuditFail", "FullPrivilegeAuditing", "AuditBaseObjects" and "AuditBaseDirectories" within the "HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\" registry key. This activity is significant as it could be a sign of a threat actor trying to tamper with the audit policy configuration, and disabling SACLs configuration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows Audit Policy Security Descriptor Tampering via Auditpol: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/set" flag, and "/sd" command-line arguments used to modify the security descriptor of the audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. An attacker, can disable certain policy categories from logging and then change the security descriptor in order to restrict access to certain users or application from reverting their changes. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows Audit Policy Auditing Option Disabled via Auditpol: endpointEndpointNoneversion:9
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/set", "/option" and "/value:disable" command-line arguments used to disable specific auditing options of the audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows Global Object Access Audit List Cleared Via Auditpol: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/resourceSACL" flag, and either the "/clear" or "/remove" command-line arguments used to remove or clear the global object access audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows Audit Policy Disabled via Legacy Auditpol: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic identifies the execution of the legacy `auditpol.exe` included with the Windows 2000 Resource Kit Tools, with the "/disable" command-line argument or one of the allowed category flags and the "none" option, in order to disable a specific logging category from the audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows Audit Policy Restored via Auditpol: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/restore" command-line argument used to restore the audit policy from a file. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. Attackers can provide an audit policy file that disables certain or all audit policy configuration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows Audit Policy Cleared via Auditpol: endpointEndpointNoneversion:9
The following analytic identifies the execution of `auditpol.exe` with the "/clear" command-line argument used to clears the audit policy. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential defense evasion by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to limit data that can be leveraged for detections and audits. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to bypass defenses, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to full machine compromise or lateral movement.
Windows AD Domain Controller Audit Policy Disabled: endpointEndpointNoneversion:12
The following analytic detects the disabling of audit policies on a domain controller. It leverages EventCode 4719 from Windows Security Event Logs to identify changes where success or failure auditing is removed. This activity is significant as it suggests an attacker may have gained access to the domain controller and is attempting to evade detection by tampering with audit policies. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to severe consequences, including data theft, privilege escalation, and full network compromise. Immediate investigation is required to determine the source and intent of the change.
