Windows Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Klist: endpointEndpointNoneversion:9
The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows OS tool klist.exe, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process details. Monitoring klist.exe is significant as it can indicate attempts to list or gather cached Kerberos tickets, which are crucial for lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to move laterally within the network or escalate privileges, posing a severe security risk.
Excessive Usage Of Cacls App: endpointEndpointNoneversion:13
The following analytic identifies excessive usage of `cacls.exe`, `xcacls.exe`,
or `icacls.exe` to change file or folder permissions.
It looks for 10 or more execution of the aforementioned processes in the span of 1 minute.
It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents,
focusing on process names and command-line executions.
This activity is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting
to restrict access to malware components or artifacts on a compromised system.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could prevent users from deleting or accessing
critical files, aiding in the persistence and concealment of malicious activities.
Windows System User Discovery Via Quser: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool quser.exe, commonly used to gather information about user sessions on a Remote Desktop Session Host server. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. Monitoring this activity is crucial as quser.exe is often abused by post-exploitation tools like winpeas, used in ransomware attacks to enumerate user sessions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this information to further compromise the system, maintain persistence, or escalate privileges.
Windows Indirect Command Execution Via forfiles: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic detects the execution of programs initiated by forfiles.exe. This command is typically used to run commands on multiple files, often within batch scripts. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where forfiles.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant because forfiles.exe can be exploited to bypass command line execution protections, making it a potential vector for malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands, potentially leading to unauthorized access or further system compromise.
Windows Information Discovery Fsutil: endpointEndpointNoneversion:13
The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows built-in tool FSUTIL with the "FSINFO" or "Volume" parameters, in order to discover file system and disk information.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details.
Monitoring this activity is significant because FSUTIL can be abused by adversaries to gather detailed information about the file system, aiding in further exploitation.
If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to map the file system, identify valuable data, and plan subsequent actions such as privilege escalation or persistence.
Recon AVProduct Through Pwh or WMI: endpointEndpointNoneversion:16
The following analytic detects suspicious PowerShell script execution via EventCode 4104, specifically targeting checks for installed anti-virus products using WMI or PowerShell commands. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging to identify scripts containing keywords like "SELECT," "WMIC," "AntiVirusProduct," or "AntiSpywareProduct." This activity is significant as it is commonly used by malware and APT actors to map running security applications or services, potentially aiding in evasion techniques. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to disable or bypass security measures, leading to further compromise of the endpoint.
Network Connection Discovery With Netstat: endpointEndpointNoneversion:8
The following analytic detects the execution of `netstat.exe` with command-line arguments to list network connections on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and parent processes. This activity is significant as both Red Teams and adversaries use `netstat.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map network connections, identify critical systems, and plan further lateral movement or data exfiltration.
Windows Security Support Provider Reg Query: endpointEndpointNoneversion:13
The following analytic identifies command-line activity querying the registry for Security Support Providers (SSPs) related to Local Security Authority (LSA) protection and configuration. This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on processes accessing specific LSA registry paths. Monitoring this activity is crucial as adversaries and post-exploitation tools like winpeas may use it to gather information on LSA protections, potentially leading to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit this to scrape password hashes or plaintext passwords from memory, significantly compromising system security.
Windows Excessive Usage Of Net App: endpointEndpointNoneversion:9
The following analytic detects excessive usage of `net.exe` within a one-minute interval. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to create, delete, or disable multiple user accounts rapidly, a tactic observed in Monero mining incidents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized user account manipulation, potentially compromising system integrity and enabling further malicious actions.
Windows Cached Domain Credentials Reg Query: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic identifies a process command line querying the CachedLogonsCount registry value in the Winlogon registry. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and registry queries. Monitoring this activity is significant as it can indicate the use of post-exploitation tools like Winpeas, which gather information about login caching settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could help attackers understand login caching configurations, potentially aiding in credential theft or lateral movement within the network.
Excessive Usage Of Net App: endpointEndpoint2025-01-24version:7
The following analytic has been deprecated. The following analytic detects excessive usage of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` within a one-minute interval. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, parent processes, and command-line executions. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an adversary attempting to create, delete, or disable multiple user accounts rapidly, a tactic observed in Monero mining incidents. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized user account manipulation, potentially compromising system integrity and enabling further malicious actions.
Windows Registry Entries Exported Via Reg: endpointEndpointNoneversion:5
The following analytic detects the execution of the reg.exe process with either the "save" or "export" parameters. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because threat actors often use the "reg save" or "reg export" command to dump credentials or test registry modification capabilities on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information stored in the registry.
Net Localgroup Discovery: endpointEndpoint2025-02-10version:6
This search has been deprecated in favour of the more generic analytic "c5c8e0f3-147a-43da-bf04-4cfaec27dc44". The following analytic detects the execution of the `net localgroup` command, which is used to enumerate local group memberships on a system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include command-line details. This activity is significant because it can indicate an attacker is gathering information about local group memberships, potentially to identify privileged accounts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to further privilege escalation or lateral movement within the network.
Windows Private Keys Discovery: endpointEndpointNoneversion:13
The following analytic identifies processes that retrieve information related to private key files, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas.
This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that search for private key certificates.
This activity is significant as it indicates potential attempts to locate insecurely stored credentials, which adversaries can exploit for privilege escalation, persistence, or remote service authentication.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to access sensitive information, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the compromised environment.
Windows WinPEAS PowerShell Script Execution: endpointEndpointNoneversion:2
Detects the execution of the WinPEAS PowerShell script via default function names used within the script.
winPEAS is a Windows tool that stands for Windows Privilege Escalation Awesome Script.
Similar to its Linux counterpart, linpeas.sh, winPEAS is designed to automate the process of identifying potential privilege escalation paths on Windows systems.
Network Connection Discovery With Net: endpointEndpoint2025-01-24version:6
The following analytic has been deprecated. The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` or `net1.exe` with command-line arguments used to list network connections on a compromised system. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it indicates potential network reconnaissance by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to gather situational awareness and Active Directory information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify critical assets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to data exfiltration or lateral movement.
Create or delete windows shares using net exe: endpointEndpointNoneversion:18
The following analytic detects the creation or deletion of Windows shares using the net.exe command. It leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data to identify processes involving net.exe with actions related to share management. This activity is significant because it may indicate an attacker attempting to manipulate network shares for malicious purposes, such as data exfiltration, malware distribution, or establishing persistence. If confirmed malicious, this activity could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, service disruption, or malware introduction. Immediate investigation is required to determine the intent and mitigate potential threats.
Windows Finger.exe Connecting to a Remote Host: endpointEndpointNoneversion:1
The following analytic identifies the `finger.exe` utility being spawned with a command line containing an `@` character, indicating a remote host/server was specified.
The Finger protocol utility is largely obsolete in modern environments and has been abused by adversaries as a living-off-the-land binary (LOLBIN) to retrieve encoded payloads or establish covert command-and-control communication with an attacker-controlled finger server.
This behavior is uncommon in legitimate enterprise usage and warrants investigation.
Windows Network Connection Discovery Via Net: endpointEndpointNoneversion:5
The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to list or display information about computer connections. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. This activity can be significant as it indicates potential network reconnaissance by adversaries or Red Teams, aiming to gather situational awareness and Active Directory information. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map the network, identify critical assets, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to data exfiltration or lateral movement.
Windows Symlink Evaluation Change via Fsutil: endpointEndpointNoneversion:5
This analytic detects the execution of the Windows built-in tool Fsutil.exe with
the "behavior", "set" and "SymlinkEvaluation" parameters.
Attackers can abuse this to alter symlink evaluation behavior on Windows, potentially enabling remote traversal over SMB shares or evading defenses.
Such changes should be uncommon or even rare in enterprise environments and should be investigated.
Windows Registry Entries Restored Via Reg: endpointEndpointNoneversion:5
The following analytic detects the execution of reg.exe with the "restore" parameter, indicating an attempt to restore registry backup data on a host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate post-exploitation actions, such as those performed by tools like winpeas, which use "reg save" and "reg restore" to manipulate registry settings. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to revert registry changes, potentially bypassing security controls and maintaining persistence.
Windows Password Managers Discovery: endpointEndpointNoneversion:13
The following analytic identifies command-line activity that searches for files related to password manager software, such as "*.kdbx*" and "*credential*". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant because attackers often target password manager databases to extract stored credentials, which can be used for further exploitation. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, enabling attackers to escalate privileges, move laterally, or exfiltrate critical data.
Windows For Loop Usage Within Cmd.exe To Execute Commands: endpointEndpointNoneversion:1
The following analytic identifies the use of a `for /f` loop with the `delims=` option within `cmd.exe`, a technique commonly used to parse and extract data from the output of other commands.
Adversaries and malicious scripts leverage this pattern to programmatically process command output for discovery, data extraction, or execution purposes while evading simpler detection logic.
Windows Credentials in Registry Reg Query: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic identifies processes querying the registry for potential passwords or credentials. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions that access specific registry paths known to store sensitive information. This activity is significant as it may indicate credential theft attempts, often used by adversaries or post-exploitation tools like winPEAS. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to privilege escalation, persistence, or lateral movement within the network, posing a severe security risk.
Windows ClipBoard Data via Get-ClipBoard: endpointEndpointNoneversion:12
The following analytic detects the execution of the PowerShell command 'Get-Clipboard' to retrieve clipboard data.
It leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify instances where this command is used.
This activity is significant because it can indicate an attempt to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, or other confidential data copied to the clipboard.
If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, potentially compromising user accounts and other critical assets.
Windows System Network Connections Discovery Netsh: endpointEndpointNoneversion:12
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows built-in tool netsh.exe to display the state, configuration, and profile of the host firewall. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions and process metadata. Monitoring this activity is crucial as netsh.exe can be used by adversaries to bypass firewall rules or discover firewall settings. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to manipulate firewall configurations, potentially leading to unauthorized network access or data exfiltration.
Network Connection Discovery With Arp: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic detects the execution of `arp.exe` with the `-a` flag, which is used to list network connections on a compromised system. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line executions, and related telemetry. Monitoring this activity is significant because both Red Teams and adversaries use `arp.exe` for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the network, identify active devices, and plan further lateral movement or attacks.
Windows Node.exe Executing JS Script In Immediate Folder: endpointEndpointNoneversion:1
The following analytic identifies `node.exe` directly executing a single `.js` script located in the same directory it was launched from, where that directory is an unusual location such as a user profile, PerfLogs, ProgramData, or Temp folder.
Legitimate Node.js application, module, and package manager directories are excluded.
This pattern is commonly associated with malware loaders and second-stage payloads that leverage the Node.js runtime to execute JavaScript outside of a typical development or application context.
Windows Process Accessing IronLanguages Repository On GitHub: endpointEndpointNoneversion:1
The following analytic identifies a process command line referencing the IronLanguages GitHub repository, which hosts .NET implementation of popular scripting engines.
Adversaries have downloaded these .NET implementations to avoid getting detected by security controls while executing their payloads.
This activity is uncommon in typical enterprise environments outside of software development contexts.
Windows Indirect Command Execution Via Series Of Forfiles: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic detects excessive usage of the forfiles.exe process, which is often indicative of post-exploitation activities. The detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs that include process GUID, process name, and parent process. This activity is significant because forfiles.exe can be abused to execute commands on multiple files, a technique used by ransomware like Prestige. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to enumerate files, potentially leading to data exfiltration or further malicious actions.
Windows Group Discovery Via Net: endpointEndpointNoneversion:7
The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query global, local and domain groups. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate local or domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory or privileged accounts discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
Windows Query Registry Reg Save: endpointEndpoint2025-01-24version:6
The following analytic has been deprecated. The following analytic detects the execution of the reg.exe process with the "save" parameter. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant because threat actors often use the "reg save" command to dump credentials or test registry modification capabilities on compromised hosts. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to escalate privileges, persist in the environment, or access sensitive information stored in the registry.
Windows Modify Registry Reg Restore: endpointEndpoint2025-01-24version:5
The following analytic has been deprecated. The following analytic detects the execution of reg.exe with the "restore" parameter, indicating an attempt to restore registry backup data on a host. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate post-exploitation actions, such as those performed by tools like winpeas, which use "reg save" and "reg restore" to manipulate registry settings. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to revert registry changes, potentially bypassing security controls and maintaining persistence.
Windows Process Accessing Windows Recall Directory: endpointEndpointNoneversion:2
This detection triggers on a process accessing the Windows Recall directory.
Recall is a new feature Microsoft release that takes screenshots every 5 or so seconds to provide context to it's AI features.
The initial release of Recall was lacking in the security department due to it being trivial to view and steal the data.
Due to this lack of security it's likely that info stealer malware will take advantage of this new feature.
Microsoft has recognized the security issues with Recall and is planning on making improvements.
Once those improvements are released we will re-assess this detection to make sure it is still relevant.
Windows Credentials from Password Stores Query: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic detects the execution of the Windows OS tool cmdkey.exe, which is often abused by post-exploitation tools like winpeas, commonly used in ransomware attacks to list stored usernames, passwords, or credentials. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process execution logs. This activity is significant as it indicates potential credential harvesting, which can lead to privilege escalation and persistence. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized access to sensitive information and maintain control over compromised systems for further exploitation.
Network Discovery Using Route Windows App: endpointEndpointNoneversion:10
The following analytic detects the execution of the `route.exe` Windows application, commonly used for network discovery. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events. This activity is significant because adversaries often use `route.exe` to map network routes and identify potential targets within a network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into network topology, facilitating lateral movement and further exploitation. Note that false positives may occur due to legitimate administrative tasks or automated scripts.
Windows System Network Config Discovery Display DNS: endpointEndpointNoneversion:12
The following analytic identifies the execution of the "ipconfig /displaydns" command, which retrieves DNS reply information using the built-in Windows tool IPConfig. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process command-line executions. Monitoring this activity is significant as threat actors and post-exploitation tools like WINPEAS often abuse this command to gather network information. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to map the network, identify DNS servers, and potentially facilitate further network-based attacks or lateral movement.
Windows Common Abused Cmd Shell Risk Behavior: endpointEndpointNoneversion:10
The following analytic identifies instances where four or more distinct detection analytics are associated with malicious command line behavior on a specific host. This detection leverages the Command Line Interface (CLI) data from various sources to identify suspicious activities. This behavior is significant as it often indicates attempts to execute malicious commands, access sensitive data, install backdoors, or perform other nefarious actions. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain unauthorized control, exfiltrate information, escalate privileges, or launch further attacks within the network, leading to severe compromise.
Windows Post Exploitation Risk Behavior: endpointEndpointNoneversion:9
The following analytic identifies four or more distinct post-exploitation behaviors on a Windows system. It leverages data from the Risk data model in Splunk Enterprise Security, focusing on multiple risk events and their associated MITRE ATT&CK tactics and techniques. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malicious actions following an initial compromise, such as persistence, privilege escalation, or data exfiltration. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to maintain control, escalate privileges, and further exploit the compromised environment, leading to significant security breaches and data loss.
Windows WMI Process And Service List: endpointEndpointNoneversion:11
The following analytic identifies suspicious WMI command lines querying for running processes or services. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific process and command-line events. This activity is significant as adversaries often use WMI to gather system information and identify services on compromised machines. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to map out the system, identify critical services, and plan further attacks, potentially leading to privilege escalation or persistence within the environment.
Windows TOR Client Execution: endpointEndpointNoneversion:4
The following analytic detects the execution of the TOR Browser and related TOR components on Windows endpoints by monitoring process creation activity.
Adversaries and insider threats leverage TOR to anonymize command-and-control traffic, facilitate data exfiltration, and evade network monitoring and policy enforcement.
While TOR can be used for legitimate research and privacy purposes, its presence on enterprise endpoints is often unusual and should be investigated to determine intent, scope, and any associated malicious behavior.
Windows SymbolicLink-Testing-Tools Utility Execution: endpointEndpointNoneversion:2
Detects the execution of tools from the `symboliclink-testing-tools` toolkit.
This toolkit is often used for exploiting Windows symbolic link, junction, and oplock vulnerabilities to achieve local privilege escalation from a standard user to SYSTEM.
Symbolic link attacks against Windows exploit a class of logical vulnerability where a SYSTEM or administrator-level process performs a file operation on a path that a low-privileged attacker can redirect using a combination of NTFS junctions, object manager symbolic links, and opportunistic locks (oplocks).
By chaining these primitives a standard user can redirect a privileged file write, delete, or read to an arbitrary path, effectively turning a narrow file operation vulnerability into arbitrary write or code execution as SYSTEM.
Domain Group Discovery With Net: endpointEndpoint2025-02-10version:7
This search has been deprecated in favour of the more generic analytic "c5c8e0f3-147a-43da-bf04-4cfaec27dc44". The following analytic identifies the execution of `net.exe` with command-line arguments used to query domain groups, specifically `group /domain`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates potential reconnaissance efforts by adversaries to enumerate domain groups, which is a common step in Active Directory Discovery. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gain insights into the domain structure, aiding in further attacks such as privilege escalation or lateral movement.
