Name:Windows Credentials from Password Stores Chrome LocalState Access id:3b1d09a8-a26f-473e-a510-6c6613573657 version:24 date:None author:Teoderick Contreras, Splunk status:production type:Anomaly Description:The following analytic detects non-Chrome processes accessing the Chrome "Local State" file, which contains critical settings and information. It leverages Windows Security Event logs, specifically event code 4663, to identify this behavior.
This activity is significant because threat actors can exploit this file to extract the encrypted master key used for decrypting saved passwords in Chrome.
If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to sensitive information, posing a severe security risk.
Monitoring this anomaly helps identify potential threats and safeguard browser-stored data. Data_source:
-Windows Event Log Security 4663
search:`wineventlog_security` EventCode=4663 object_file_path="*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\User Data\\Local State" NOT process_path IN ( "*:\\Windows\\explorer.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Beta\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Dev\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome SxS\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome Unstable\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\AppData\\Local\\Google\\Chrome\\Application\\chrome.exe", "*\\platform_experience_helper.exe*", "*:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft\\Edge\\Application\\msedge.exe*" ) | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
by object_file_name object_file_path process_name process_path process_id EventCode dest
how_to_implement:To successfully implement this search, you must ingest Windows Security Event logs and track event code 4663.
For 4663, enable "Audit Object Access" in Group Policy. Then check the two boxes listed for both "Success" and "Failure." known_false_positives:The chrome uninstaller will access these set of files and folders. Filter as needed. References: -https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.redline_stealer drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['StealC Stealer', 'DarkGate Malware', 'Malicious Inno Setup Loader', 'NjRAT', 'Phemedrone Stealer', 'Salt Typhoon', 'Amadey', 'Earth Alux', 'Warzone RAT', 'Quasar RAT', 'PXA Stealer', 'RedLine Stealer', 'SnappyBee', 'Meduza Stealer', 'Braodo Stealer', 'MoonPeak', 'Snake Keylogger', 'China-Nexus Threat Activity', '0bj3ctivity Stealer', 'Lokibot', 'Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters', 'BlankGrabber Stealer', 'VIP Keylogger', 'Salat Stealer', 'Phantom Stealer', 'Vidar Stealer']
