Name:Windows Execution of Microsoft MSC File In Suspicious Path id:ac30858b-7c25-4f0a-a7fa-bef036e49dc3 version:5 date:None author:Teoderick Contreras, Splunk status:production type:Anomaly Description:The following analytic detects when a Microsoft Management Console (MMC) process executes an .msc file in a suspicious path on a Windows system. While .msc files are legitimate components used for system administration, unexpected execution of these files by non-administrative processes or in unusual contexts can indicate malicious activity, such as living-off-the-land attacks, persistence mechanisms, or automated administrative abuse. This detection monitors process creation events, command-line arguments, and parent process relationships to help distinguish normal administrative usage from potential threats. Alerts should be investigated in the context of the process initiating the .msc file, the target system, and any subsequent network or system activity, as routine administrative tasks may also trigger this behavior. Data_source:
-Sysmon EventID 1
-Windows Event Log Security 4688
-CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2
search:| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=mmc.exe) AND Processes.process = "*.msc*" AND Processes.process IN ( "*\\PerfLogs\\*", "*\\programdata\\*" "*Recycle.bin*", "*\\Download*", "*\\temp\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*\\Users\\Default\\*", "*\\Users\\Public\\*", "*\\Users\\Administrator\\Music\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*", "*:\\Windows\\INF\\*" "*:\\Windows\\debug\\*", "*:\\Windows\\fonts\\*", "*:\\Windows\\Media\\*", "*:\\Windows\\repair\\*", "*:\\Windows\\servicing\\*", ) AND NOT (Processes.process IN ("*C:\\Windows\\System32\\eventvwr.msc*", "*C:\\Windows\\System32\\certmgr.msc*"))
how_to_implement:The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint` data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process. known_false_positives:A possible false positive (FP) for the execution of .msc files is legitimate administrative activity, since .msc files are standard Microsoft Management Console snap-ins used for system administration. References: -https://www.securonix.com/blog/analyzing-fluxconsole-using-tax-themed-lures-threat-actors-exploit-windows-management-console-to-deliver-backdoor-payloads/ -https://research.checkpoint.com/2019/microsoft-management-console-mmc-vulnerabilities/ drilldown_searches: name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"' earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$' latest_offset:'$info_max_time$' name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"' search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`' earliest_offset:'7d' latest_offset:'0' analytic_story:['XML Runner Loader']
