Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS

 Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS
id:9029b575-6f6b-4ab1-b660-67b24b7e9c3d
version:5
date:None
author:Raven Tait, Splunk
status:production
type:TTP
Description:Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5136, 5137, 4662, looking for DNS events with specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION entries.
Data_source:
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4662
  • -Windows Event Log Security 5136
  • -Windows Event Log Security 5137
search:`wineventlog_security` (((EventCode="5136" OR EventCode="5137") ObjectClass="dnsNode" ObjectDN="*1UWhRCA*" ObjectDN="*AAAAA*" ObjectDN="*YBAAAA*") OR (EventCode="4662" AdditionalInfo="*1UWhRCA*" AdditionalInfo="*AAAAA*" AdditionalInfo="*YBAAAA*"))

| eval Object=coalesce(lower(ObjectGUID), trim(AdditionalInfo2, "%{}"))

| eval user=coalesce(SubjectUserName, Caller_User_Name)

| stats min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode) as event_codes values(ObjectDN) as dns_record values(user) as user values(Computer) as dest
BY Object

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`

| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`

| `windows_kerberos_coercion_via_dns_filter`


how_to_implement:To successfully implement this search, you ned to be ingesting Event codes `4662`, `5136`, `5137`. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting `Audit Directory Services Changes` within `DS Access` needs to be enabled. For these event codes to be generated, specific SACLs are required.
known_false_positives:Creating a DNS entry matching this pattern is very unusual in a production environment. Filter as needed.
References:
  -https://web.archive.org/web/20250617122747/https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025
  -https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/relaying-kerberos-over-smb-using-krbrelayx
  -https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/the-birth-and-death-of-loopyticket/
drilldown_searches:
 name:'View the detection results for - "$dest$"'
 search:'%original_detection_search% | search Computer = "$dest$"'
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
 name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$dest$"'
 search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$dest$") | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
 earliest_offset:'7d'
 latest_offset:'0'
analytic_story:['Compromised Windows Host', 'Suspicious DNS Traffic', 'Local Privilege Escalation With KrbRelayUp', 'Kerberos Coercion with DNS']

asset_type:Endpoint

mitre_attack_id:['T1071.004', 'T1557.001', 'T1187']

product:['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']

category:endpoint

security_domain:endpoint

tags:

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1071.004/kerberos_coercion/windows-xml.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
 test_type:'unit'
manual_test:None