Windows Suspicious Burst of Password Changes

 Original Source: [splunk source]
Name:Windows Suspicious Burst of Password Changes
id:0dcfcab9-e936-43bc-8203-005e17dc0744
version:1
date:None
author:Raven Tait, Splunk
status:production
type:TTP
Description:A regular user account performed rapid, repeated password changes across multiple local accounts within a 2-second window. This pattern is consistent with automated credential manipulation tools that cycle account passwords to deny access to defenders or escalate privileges The speed and volume of changes indicates scripted or tooled activity rather than manual administration, as legitimate password resets do not occur at machine speed across multiple accounts simultaneously.
Data_source:
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4723
  • -Windows Event Log Security 4724
search:`wineventlog_security`
(
EventCode=4723
OR
EventCode=4724
)
| eval log_time = strptime(SystemTime, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S.%6NZ")
| eval log_time = coalesce(log_time, _time)
| eval time_bucket = floor(log_time / 2) * 2
| eval SubjectRID = tonumber(replace(SubjectUserSid, ".*-(\d+)$", "\1"))
| where SubjectRID >= 1000
| stats count AS EventsForAccount
min(log_time) AS firstTime
max(log_time) AS lastTime
by Computer TargetUserName SubjectUserName time_bucket

| where EventsForAccount >= 4
| eval DurationSecs = round(lastTime - firstTime, 3), DurationSecs = if(DurationSecs = 0, 0.001, DurationSecs), ChangeRatePerSec = round(EventsForAccount / DurationSecs, 2)
| rename Computer as dest

| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS AffectedAccounts
values(TargetUserName) AS Accounts
values(SubjectUserName) AS InitiatingAccounts
sum(EventsForAccount) AS TotalEvents
max(ChangeRatePerSec) AS PeakChangeRatePerSec
min(DurationSecs) AS FastestBurstSecs
min(firstTime) AS firstTime
max(lastTime) AS lastTime
by dest time_bucket

| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_suspicious_burst_of_password_changes_filter`


how_to_implement:To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting EventID 4723 and EventID 4724 events with the Windows TA.
known_false_positives:Service accounts may be responsible for the creation, deletion or modification of accounts for legitimate purposes. Filter as needed.
References:
  -https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/BlueHammer
drilldown_searches:
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
 name:'View the detection results for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
 search:'%original_detection_search% | search user = "$user$" dest = "$dest$"'
 earliest_offset:'$info_min_time$'
 latest_offset:'$info_max_time$'
 name:'View risk events for the last 7 days for - "$user$" and "$dest$"'
 search:'| from datamodel Risk.All_Risk | search normalized_risk_object IN ("$user$", "$dest$") starthoursago=168 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(search_name) as "Search Name" values(risk_message) as "Risk Message" values(analyticstories) as "Analytic Stories" values(annotations._all) as "Annotations" values(annotations.mitre_attack.mitre_tactic) as "ATT&CK Tactics" by normalized_risk_object | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`'
analytic_story:['Windows Privilege Escalation', 'BlueHammer']

asset_type:Endpoint

mitre_attack_id:['T1068']

product:['Splunk Enterprise', 'Splunk Enterprise Security', 'Splunk Cloud']

category:endpoint

security_domain:endpoint

tags:

tests:
 name:'True Positive Test'
 attack_data:
  data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1068/bluehammer/windows-security.log
  source: XmlWinEventLog:Security
  sourcetype: XmlWinEventLog
 test_type:'unit'
manual_test:None