ATT&CKCampaignsRedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations

C0047

Campaign, Jul 2023 to Dec 2024.View on attack.mitre.org

About this campaign

RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations was executed by Mustang Panda from mid-2023 through the end of 2024 against multiple entities in East and Southeast Asia. RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations involved phishing to deliver malicious files or links to users prompting follow-on installer downloads to load PlugX on victim machines in a persistent state.

Techniques used22

Procedure examples22

TechniqueProcedure example
T1027.013
Encrypted/Encoded File

Mustang Panda stored installation payloads as encrypted files in hidden folders during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1036.004
Masquerade Task or Service

Mustang Panda masqueraded Registry run keys as legitimate-looking service names such as `OneNote Update` during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1059.001
PowerShell

Mustang Panda used LNK files to execute PowerShell commands leading to eventual PlugX installation during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1071.001
Web Protocols

Mustang Panda used HTTP POST messages for command and control from PlugX installations during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1082
System Information Discovery

Mustang Panda captured victim operating system type via User Agent analysis during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1090
Proxy

Mustang Panda proxied communication through the Cloudflare CDN service during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1095
Non-Application Layer Protocol

Mustang Panda communicated over TCP 5000 from adversary administrative servers to adversary command and control nodes during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1203
Exploitation for Client Execution

Mustang Panda used the GrimResource exploitation technique via specially crafted MSC files for arbitrary code execution during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1204.001
Malicious Link

Mustang Panda distributed hyperlinks that would result in an MSC file running a PowerShell command to download and install a remotely-hosted MSI file during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1204.002
Malicious File

Mustang Panda distributed malicious LNK objects for user execution during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1218.007
Msiexec

Mustang Panda initial payloads downloaded a Windows Installer MSI file that in turn dropped follow-on files leading to installation of PlugX during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1218.014
MMC

Mustang Panda used Microsoft Management Console Snap-In Control files, or MSC files, executed via MMC to run follow-on PowerShell commands during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1480
Execution Guardrails

Mustang Panda included the use of Cloudflare geofencing mechanisms to limit payload download activity during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Mustang Panda used Run registry keys with names such as `OneNote Update` to execute legitimate executables that would load through search-order hijacking malicious DLLS to ensure persistence during RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

T1553.002
Code Signing

Mustang Panda used legitimate, signed binaries such as `inkform.exe` or `ExcelRepairToolboxLauncher.exe` for follow-on execution of malicious DLLs through DLL search order hijacking in RedDelta Modified PlugX Infection Chain Operations.

View all 22 procedure examples

Attributed groups1

Software2

References1

  1. Recorded Future RedDelta 2025 Open source
    Insikt Group. (2025, January 9). Chinese State-Sponsored RedDelta Targeted Taiwan, Mongolia, and Southeast Asia with Adapted PlugX Infection Chain. Retrieved January 14, 2025.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.