ATT&CKReferencesCrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021

CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021

CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.

Open the source

Techniques0

Not cited by any technique.

Groups1

Software1

Campaigns0

None recorded.

Procedure examples15

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT encrypted log entries it collected with the stream cipher RC4 using a hard-coded key. It also uses AES128-CBC encrypted blobs for SUNBURST source code and data extracted from the SolarWinds Orion <MsBuild.exe</code> process.

T1027.005
Indicator Removal from Tools
MalwareSUNBURST

SUNBURST source code used generic variable names and pre-obfuscated strings, and was likely sanitized of developer comments before being added to SUNSPOT.

T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT was identified on disk with a filename of taskhostsvc.exe and it created an encrypted log file at C:\Windows\Temp\vmware-vmdmp.log.

T1053.005
Scheduled Task
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used `scheduler` and `schtasks` to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement. They manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration. APT29 also created a scheduled task to maintain SUNSPOT persistence when the host booted.

T1057
Process Discovery
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT monitored running processes for instances of MsBuild.exe by hashing the name of each running process and comparing it to the corresponding value 0x53D525. It also extracted command-line arguments and individual arguments from the running MsBuild.exe process to identify the directory path of the Orion software Visual Studio solution.

T1070.004
File Deletion
MalwareSUNSPOT

Following the successful injection of SUNBURST, SUNSPOT deleted a temporary file it created named InventoryManager.bk after restoring the original SolarWinds Orion source code to the software library.

T1083
File and Directory Discovery
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT enumerated the Orion software Visual Studio solution directory path.

T1106
Native API
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT used Windows API functions such as MoveFileEx and NtQueryInformationProcess as part of the SUNBURST injection process.

T1134
Access Token Manipulation
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT modified its security token to grants itself debugging privileges by adding SeDebugPrivilege.

T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT decrypts SUNBURST, which was stored in AES128-CBC encrypted blobs.

T1195.002
Compromise Software Supply Chain
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT malware was designed and used to insert SUNBURST into software builds of the SolarWinds Orion IT management product.

T1480
Execution Guardrails
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT only replaces SolarWinds Orion source code if the MD5 checksums of both the original source code file and backdoored replacement source code match hardcoded values.

T1480.002
Mutual Exclusion
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT creates a mutex using the hard-coded value ` {12d61a41-4b74-7610-a4d8-3028d2f56395}` to ensure that only one instance of itself is running.

T1565.001
Stored Data Manipulation
MalwareSUNSPOT

SUNSPOT created a copy of the SolarWinds Orion software source file with a .bk extension to backup the original content, wrote SUNBURST using the same filename but with a .tmp extension, and then moved SUNBURST using MoveFileEx to the original filename with a .cs extension so it could be compiled within Orion software.

T1587.001
Malware
CampaignSolarWinds Compromise

For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used numerous pieces of malware that were likely developed for or by the group, including SUNBURST, SUNSPOT, Raindrop, and TEARDROP.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.