Hunt.io TeamPCP Toolkit MAY 2026

Mini Shai-Hulud has established Fallback Channels to exfiltrate data to Github when other configured infrastructure is found to be unreachable.

Mini Shai-Hulud has leveraged a user-agent string that mimics a standard git client to avoid detection within network logs.

Mini Shai-Hulud has exfiltrated encrypted archives over C2 domains.

TeamPCP has leveraged malware capable of execution via the Linux CLI.

TeamPCP has poisoned PyPi packages with malicious code and has used a 13 file modular Python framework for data collection.

Mini Shai-Hulud has utilized the Docker command-line tool to gather details of the victim environment and collect credentials.

Mini Shai-Hulud has gathered system information of victim hosts through the use of common discovery commands to include `hostname`, `uname-a` and `printenv`. Mini Shai-Hulud has also conducted system checks of the victim device to include enumerating the system type and the number of CPUs operating on victim host.

Mini Shai-Hulud has enumerated home directories, file paths and files associated with storing or containing credentials and other secrets.

Mini Shai-Hulud has enumerated cloud accounts and subscriptions accessible to the targeted identity.

Mini Shai-Hulud has leveraged GitHub commit-search API to recover fallback C2 domains stored in auto-created public Github repositories.

Mini Shai-Hulud has the ability to download additional payloads from adversary controlled or compromised infrastructure.

Mini Shai-Hulud has queried the system timezone configuration and timezone data files to include `/etc/localtime`, and locale settings to determine the geolocation of the compromised host.

Mini Shai-Hulud has used base64 encoding to obfuscate URLs used for C2.

TeamPCP has conducted coordinated supply chain attacks targeting open-source developer infrastructure including the NPM, VS Code, Docker, and PyPi ecosystems to compromise multiple software packages.

Mini Shai-Hulud has examined commit messages for a keyword followed by base64 encoded segments to validate communications and to execute subsequent actions to include exfiltration.

Mini Shai-Hulud has utilized execution guardrails in order to prevent operating in restricted geolocations to include Russia by checking the devices language and terminating when a forbidden value is detected. Mini Shai-Hulud has also utilized designated instructions that execute when victim hosts match geolocations to include wiping victim devices when the device is determined to be located within Iran or Israel.

Mini Shai-Hulud has wiped data on devices that fall within specified parameters to include those that resolve to specific geolocations including Iran and Israel. Mini Shai-Hulud has also implemented a dead-man’s switch that wipes the victims home directory if the operator revokes a GitHub token created by the adversary.

Mini Shai-Hulud has evaded sandbox detection by applying a 1-in-6 probability gate that generates a random number which will only trigger the wiper functionality when the set number outcome is met even in environments that match parameters of a geopolitical target.

Mini Shai-Hulud has evaded execution in virtual environments and sandboxes through checking system information to include the number of CPUs and exiting at times when there were less than four and other times when there were less than two CPUs.

Mini Shai-Hulud has stolen application access tokens and other tokens to include those associated with CI/CD.

Mini Shai-Hulud has created .service files using Systemd on victim Linux hosts to establish persistence.

Mini Shai-Hulud has collected credentials stored within configuration files. Mini Shai-Hulud has also gathered credentials from files stored in common credential file paths to include targeting git-credentials, azureProfile.json, and application_default_credentials.json.

Mini Shai-Hulud has gathered unsecured credentials to include SSH private keys within .ssh.

Mini Shai-Hulud has gathered credentials and secrets from AWS, Google Cloud Platform (GCP) and Azure metadata API.

Mini Shai-Hulud has gathered unsecured API keys stored in container orchestrators.

Mini Shai-Hulud has gathered credentials stored in password managers to include password vaults.

Mini Shai-Hulud has captured credentials stored in cloud secret stores.

Mini Shai-Hulud has executed via the use of `subprocess.run` and fed input through standard input `stdin` which acted as a pipe to send data from the parent process and the child process `sys.executable` within memory.

Mini Shai-Hulud has compressed collected credentials to reduce transmission size and to make string content harder to detect in memory forensics captures.

Mini Shai-Hulud has suppressed output so that nothing is printed to terminal and has utilized silent exiting when environmental variables match restricted values.

Mini Shai-Hulud has exfiltrated data through the use of the victim’s own GitHub repository by creating a new public repository using a unique naming convention from a curated list of key words or themes.

TeamPCP has leased infrastructure specifically for offensive operations including Google assets in AS396982.

Mini Shai-Hulud has discovered the compromised systems location through a query of the system timezone configuration and the locale settings.

Mini Shai-Hulud has collected victim client certificates to assist in signed authentication assertion with Azure environments.

TeamPCP has compromised trusted CI/CD pipelines by injecting credential-stealing payloads into legitimate workflows and software packages including open-source security tools Trivy and KICS, and AI gateway LiteLLM.