Sherstobitoff, R. (2018, February 12). Lazarus Resurfaces, Targets Global Banks and Bitcoin Users. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
Not cited by any technique.
None recorded.
None recorded.
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1001.003 Protocol or Service Impersonation |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, potentially evading SSL traffic inspection/decryption. |
| T1012 Query Registry |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key: |
| T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has used multiple types of encryption and encoding for their payloads, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, XOR, Base64, and other tricks such as creating aliases in code for Native API function names. |
| T1033 System Owner/User Discovery |
GroupLazarus Group | Various Lazarus Group malware enumerates logged-on users. |
| T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware. |
| T1055.001 Dynamic-link Library Injection |
GroupLazarus Group | A Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection. |
| T1057 Process Discovery |
GroupLazarus Group | Several Lazarus Group malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also gathers process times. |
| T1059.003 Windows Command Shell |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS. |
| T1082 System Information Discovery |
GroupLazarus Group | Several Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information. |
| T1132.001 Standard Encoding |
GroupLazarus Group | A Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64. |
| T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key. |
| T1547.009 Shortcut Modification |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder. |
| T1560 Archive Collected Data |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. |
| T1560.002 Archive via Library |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server. |
| T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method |
GroupLazarus Group | A Lazarus Group malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration. |
| T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories |
GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application. |
| T1573.001 Symmetric Cryptography |
GroupLazarus Group | Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic. |
| T1680 Local Storage Discovery |
GroupLazarus Group | A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.