ATT&CKReferencesSekoia ClickFake 2025

Sekoia ClickFake 2025

Amaury G., Coline Chavane, Felix Aimé and Sekoia TDR. (2025, March 31). From Contagious to ClickFake Interview: Lazarus leveraging the ClickFix tactic. Retrieved April 1, 2025.

Open the source

Techniques1

Groups0

None recorded.

Software0

None recorded.

Campaigns0

None recorded.

Procedure examples17

TechniqueUsed byProcedure example
T1036
Masquerading
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has delivered BeaverTail malware masquerading as legitimate software or applications. Contagious Interview has also delivered malicious payloads masquerading as legitimate software drivers.

T1059.003
Windows Command Shell
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has utilized VBS scripts to open cmd.exe and run commands to include the go_batch.bat batch file.

T1059.004
Unix Shell
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has targeted macOS victim hosts using a bash downloader coremedia.sh and a bash script cloud.sh.

T1059.005
Visual Basic
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has utilized Visual Basic scripts in the execution of their downloader malware targeting Windows devices including as script called update.vbs.

T1059.007
JavaScript
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has leveraged JavaScript in the execution of their downloader malware targeting Windows devices using a NodeJS script titled nvidia.js.

T1082
System Information Discovery
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has configured malicious webpages to identify the victim’s operating system by reviewing the details of the victims User-Agent of their browser.

T1204.004
Malicious Copy and Paste
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has leveraged ClickFix type tactics enticing victims to copy and paste malicious code.

T1543.001
Launch Agent
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has established persistence using InvisibleFerret malware to create file to run the script on Startup via LaunchAgents. Contagious Interview has also utilized a plist file located in `/Library/LaunchAgents` to enable a malicious bash script the ability to persist.

T1546.004
Unix Shell Configuration Modification
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has targeted macOS victim hosts using a bash downloader `coremedia.sh` and a bash script `cloud.sh`.

T1555.001
Keychain
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has leveraged malware variants configured to dump credentials from the macOS keychain.

T1566.003
Spearphishing via Service
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has used fake job advertisements and messages sent via social media to spearphish targets. Contagious Interview has also leveraged hiring websites to solicit victims.

T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has exfiltrated stolen passwords to Dropbox.

T1573.001
Symmetric Cryptography
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has encrypted C2 traffic using RC4.

T1583.001
Domains
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has registered domains to leverage in their social engineering campaigns. Contagious Interview has also registered domains to utilize for C2.

T1583.006
Web Services
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has used web services such as Dropbox to receive stolen data and Google Drive, Firebase, GitHub, and Telegram to disseminate files. Contagious Interview has also used a cloud platform such as Vercel for C2 operations leveraging malicious web applications and static pages. Contagious Interview has also used Slack to coordinate their activities.

T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview has researched specific professional groups such as software developers for targeting. Contagious Interview has also researched individuals who work in roles related to cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies.

T1593.001
Social Media
GroupContagious Interview

Contagious Interview had identified and solicited victims through social media such as LinkedIn, X, and Telegram.

Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.