Technique with 3 sub-techniques.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's identity that can be used during targeting. Information about identities may include a variety of details, including personal data (ex: employee names, email addresses, security question responses, etc.) as well as sensitive details such as credentials or multi-factor authentication (MFA) configurations.
Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via Phishing for Information. Information about users could also be enumerated via other active means (i.e. Active Scanning) such as probing and analyzing responses from authentication services that may reveal valid usernames in a system or permitted MFA /methods associated with those usernames. Information about victims may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: Social Media or Search Victim-Owned Websites).
Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: Search Open Websites/Domains or Phishing for Information), establishing operational resources (ex: Compromise Accounts), and/or initial access (ex: Phishing or Valid Accounts).
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1589 or one of its sub-techniques.
| Rule | Level | Log source | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|
| Azure AD Account Credential Leaked | high | azure / NULL | T1589 |
| Potential Unconstrained Delegation Discovery Via Get-ADComputer - ScriptBlock | medium | windows / ps_script | T1589.002 |
| SSHD Error Message CVE-2018-15473 | medium | linux / NULL | T1589 |
| Rule | Type | Risk | Data source | Technique |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kerberos User Enumeration | Anomaly | NULL | Windows Event Log Security 4768 | T1589.002 |
| Linux Medusa Rootkit | TTP | NULL | Sysmon for Linux EventID 11 | T1589.001 |
| Windows Gather Victim Identity SAM Info | Hunting | NULL | Sysmon EventID 7 | T1589.001 |
None recorded.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupAPT32 | APT32 has conducted targeted surveillance against activists and bloggers. |
| GroupContagious Interview | Contagious Interview has researched specific professional groups such as software developers for targeting. Contagious Interview has also researched individuals who work in roles related to cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies. PaloAlto ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibleFerret November 2023PaloAlto Unit42 ContagiousInterview BeaverTail InvisibileFerret October 2024SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview FamousChollima October 2024SecurityScorecard Contagious Interview October 2024Securonix Contagious Interview DEVPOPPER April 2024Sekoia ClickFake 2025Sentinel One Contagious Interview ClickFix September 2025Socket HexEval BeaverTail Contagious Interview June 2025 |
| GroupFIN13 | FIN13 has researched employees to target for social engineering attacks. |
| GroupHEXANE | HEXANE has identified specific potential victims at targeted organizations. |
| GroupLAPSUS$ | LAPSUS$ has gathered detailed information of target employees to enhance their social engineering lures. |
| GroupMagic Hound | Magic Hound has acquired mobile phone numbers of potential targets, possibly for mobile malware or additional phishing operations. |
| GroupScattered Spider | Scattered Spider has used information from previous data breaches to identify employee names to be used in social engineering. |
| GroupStar Blizzard | Star Blizzard has identified ways to engage targets by researching potential victims' interests and social or professional contacts. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| CampaignOperation Dream Job | For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted extensive reconnaissance research on potential targets. |
| CampaignOperation Wocao | During Operation Wocao, threat actors targeted people based on their organizational roles and privileges. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.
