Google Salesforce JUN 2025

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used voice calls to socially engineer victims into authorizing a modified version of the Salesforce Data Loader app.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used custom applications developed in python.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used compromised credentials for lateral movement.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Mullvad VPN IPs to proxy voice phishing calls.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used Tor IPs for voice calls and for the collection of stolen data.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors accessed and exfiltrated sensitive information from compromised Salesforce instances.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors exfiltrated data via legitimate Salesforce API communication channels including the Salesforce Data Loader application.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors created Salesforce trial accounts to register their malicious applications.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors registered emails shinycorp@tuta[.]com and shinygroup@tuta[.]com to send victims extortion demands.

ShinyHunters has established multiple email accounts, such as shinycorp@tutonota[.]com, for use in extortion activities.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors used compromised emails to create Salesforce trial accounts.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors created malicious applications within Salesforce trial accounts, typically Python scripts with similar function to the Salesforce Data Loader.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors initially relied on the legitimate Salesforce Data Loader app for data exfiltration.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors initiated voice calls with victims to socially engineer them into authorizing malicious applications or divulging sensitive credentials.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors established an Okta phishing panel which victims were tricked into accessing from mobile phones or work computers during social engineering calls.

ShinyHunters has called or sent text messages or emails to employees of victim organizations to demand payment in Bitcoin within 72 hours. Email addresses used in extortion activities include shinycorp@tuta[.]com, shinygroup@tuta[.]com, shinycorp@tutanota[.]com, and shinygroup@onionmail[.]com.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors deceived victims into authorizing malicious connected apps to their organization's Salesforce portal.

During Salesforce Data Exfiltration, threat actors impersonated IT support personnel in voice calls with victims at times claiming to be addressing enterprise-wide connectivity issues.