Booz Allen Hamilton. (2016). When The Lights Went Out. Retrieved December 18, 2024.
Not cited by any technique.
None recorded.
None recorded.
None recorded.
| Technique | Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|---|
| T1055 Process Injection |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team loaded BlackEnergy into svchost.exe, which then launched iexplore.exe for their C2. |
| T1056.001 Keylogging |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team gathered account credentials via a BlackEnergy keylogger plugin. |
| T1059.005 Visual Basic |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a VBA script called `vba_macro.exe`. This macro dropped `FONTCACHE.DAT`, the primary BlackEnergy implant; `rundll32.exe`, for executing the malware; `NTUSER.log`, an empty file; and desktop.ini, the default file used to determine folder displays on Windows machines. |
| T1070.004 File Deletion |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, vba_macro.exe deletes itself after `FONTCACHE.DAT`, `rundll32.exe`, and the associated .lnk file is delivered. |
| T1071.001 Web Protocols |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests. |
| T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team pushed additional malicious tools onto an infected system to steal user credentials, move laterally, and destroy data. |
| T1112 Modify Registry |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry Internet settings to lower internet security before launching `rundll32.exe`, which in-turn launches the malware and communicates with C2 servers over the Internet. . |
| T1133 External Remote Services |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a modified Dropbear SSH client as the backdoor to target systems. |
| T1136.002 Domain Account |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team created privileged domain accounts to be used for further exploitation and lateral movement. |
| T1218.011 Rundll32 |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a backdoor which could execute a supplied DLL using `rundll32.exe`. |
| T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team moved their tools laterally within the corporate network and between the ICS and corporate network. |
| T1685 Disable or Modify Tools |
Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team modified in-registry internet settings to lower internet security. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.