Technique.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may leverage external-facing remote services to initially access and/or persist within a network. Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management and VNC can also be used externally.
Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as a redundant or persistent access mechanism during an operation.
Access may also be gained through an exposed service that doesn’t require authentication. In containerized environments, this may include an exposed Docker API, Kubernetes API server, kubelet, or web application such as the Kubernetes dashboard.
Adversaries may also establish persistence on network by configuring a Tor hidden service on a compromised system. Adversaries may utilize the tool `ShadowLink` to facilitate the installation and configuration of the Tor hidden service. Tor hidden service is then accessible via the Tor network because `ShadowLink` sets up a .onion address on the compromised system. `ShadowLink` may be used to forward any inbound connections to RDP, allowing the adversaries to have remote access. Adversaries may get `ShadowLink` to persist on a system by masquerading it as an MS Defender application.
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1133.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupAkira | Akira uses compromised VPN accounts for initial access to victim networks. |
| GroupAPT-C-36 | APT-C-36 has used VPNs in their operational infrastructure. |
| GroupAPT18 | APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services. |
| GroupAPT28 | APT28 has used Tor and a variety of commercial VPN services to route brute force authentication attempts. |
| GroupAPT29 | APT29 has used compromised identities to access networks via VPNs and Citrix. |
| GroupAPT41 | APT41 compromised an online billing/payment service using VPN access between a third-party service provider and the targeted payment service. |
| GroupChimera | Chimera has used legitimate credentials to login to an external VPN, Citrix, SSH, and other remote services. |
| GroupDragonfly | Dragonfly has used VPNs and Outlook Web Access (OWA) to maintain access to victim networks. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| MalwareDoki | Doki was executed through an open Docker daemon API port. |
| MalwareHildegard | Hildegard was executed through an unsecure kubelet that allowed anonymous access to the victim environment. |
| MalwareKinsing | Kinsing was executed in an Ubuntu container deployed via an open Docker daemon API. |
| MalwareLinux Rabbit | Linux Rabbit attempts to gain access to the server via SSH. |
| MalwareMafalda | Mafalda can establish an SSH connection from a compromised host to a server. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| Campaign2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack | During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team installed a modified Dropbear SSH client as the backdoor to target systems. |
| Campaign2025 Poland Wiper Attacks | During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, threat actors leveraged the FortiGate VPN interface that was exposed to the internet to gain access to the victim environment. |
| CampaignArcaneDoor | ArcaneDoor used WebVPN sessions commonly associated with Clientless SSLVPN services to communicate to compromised devices. |
| CampaignC0027 | During C0027, Scattered Spider used Citrix and VPNs to persist in compromised environments. |
| CampaignC0032 | During the C0032 campaign, TEMP.Veles used VPN access to persist in the victim environment. |
| CampaignCostaRicto | During CostaRicto, the threat actors set up remote tunneling using an SSH tool to maintain access to a compromised environment. |
| CampaignNight Dragon | During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems. |
| CampaignOperation CuckooBees | During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled WinRM over HTTP/HTTPS as a backup persistence mechanism using the following command: `cscript //nologo "C:\Windows\System32\winrm.vbs" set winrm/config/service@{EnableCompatibilityHttpsListener="true"}`. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.