Sub-technique of T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information.View on attack.mitre.org
Adversaries may obfuscate then dynamically resolve API functions called by their malware in order to conceal malicious functionalities and impair defensive analysis. Malware commonly uses various Native API functions provided by the OS to perform various tasks such as those involving processes, files, and other system artifacts.
API functions called by malware may leave static artifacts such as strings in payload files. Defensive analysts may also uncover which functions a binary file may execute via an import address table (IAT) or other structures that help dynamically link calling code to the shared modules that provide functions.
To avoid static or other defensive analysis, adversaries may use dynamic API resolution to conceal malware characteristics and functionalities. Similar to Software Packing, dynamic API resolution may change file signatures and obfuscate malicious API function calls until they are resolved and invoked during runtime.
Various methods may be used to obfuscate malware calls to API functions. For example, hashes of function names are commonly stored in malware in lieu of literal strings. Malware can use these hashes (or other identifiers) to manually reproduce the linking and loading process using functions such as `GetProcAddress()` and `LoadLibrary()`. These hashes/identifiers can also be further obfuscated using encryption or other string manipulation tricks (requiring various forms of Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information during execution).
Rules on DetectionCode tagged with T1027.007.
None recorded.
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| GroupKimsuky | Kimsuky has leveraged dynamic API resolution using custom hashing techniques. |
| GroupLazarus Group | Lazarus Group has used a custom hashing method to resolve APIs used in shellcode. |
| GroupMustang Panda | Mustang Panda has leveraged obfuscated Windows API function calls that were concealed as unique names, or hashes of the Windows API. |
| Used by | Procedure example |
|---|---|
| MalwareAvosLocker | AvosLocker has used obfuscated API calls that are retrieved by their checksums. |
| MalwareBazar | Bazar can hash then resolve API calls at runtime. |
| ToolBrute Ratel C4 | Brute Ratel C4 can call and dynamically resolve hashed APIs. |
| MalwareCANONSTAGER | CANONSTAGER has utilized custom API hashing to obfuscate the Windows APIs being used. |
| MalwareCHIMNEYSWEEP | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use `LoadLibrary` and `GetProcAddress` to resolve Windows API function strings at run time. |
| MalwareCLAIMLOADER | CLAIMLOADER has utilized XOR-encrypted API names and native APIs of `LdrLoadDll()` and `LderGetProcedureAddress()` to resolve imports dynamically. |
| MalwareHiddenFace | HiddenFace can dynamically resolve Windows APIs. |
| MalwareHTTPTroy | HTTPTroy has utilized dynamic API resolution by reconstructing API calls during runtime using combinations of arithmetic and logical operations to complicate static analysis. |
Data from MITRE ATT&CK® (Enterprise). ATT&CK® is a registered trademark of The MITRE Corporation.